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I. INTRODUCTION
The best way to drive out the devil.., is to jeer andflout him, for he cannot
bear scorn.
- MartinLuther
{1) The scene is set in an upscale, but spartanly-furnished penthouse in Manhattan, the high ceilings and
marble floors vaguely resembling "Citizen Kane's" palatial Xanadu. A fire burns in a grand fireplace
which faces, oddly enough, an altar. Spanning the entire wall behind the altar hangs an ethereal statue of
clouds and intertwined human figures in various poses. The penthouse owner is the managing partner of
a highly connected and terribly crooked New York law firm. He is also the devil.
(2) In "The Devil's Advocate," [il Al Pacino stars as John Milton (a clever literary alias used to conceal
the character's true identity as the devil). Milton's designs for world conquest require his influential firm
to undermine the judicial system in America. Milton boasts of a future when the stench of mass
acquittals and gross injustices on earth will choke out Heaven's inhabitants. Poised on the brink between
the realization of all his carnal desires and his soul's salvation stands Keanu Reeves as Kevin Lomax, a

young and talented criminal lawyer (and a University of Florida alumnus) who is Milton's protdg6. As
the film progresses, we find that Lomax is also Milton's illegitimate son. In the climatic finale, with
promises of bliss and riches intertwined with blasphemous vitriol, Milton pitches his best offer to
Lomax - join Milton and help usher the antichrist into the world to overthrow Heaven. All the while, as
Lomax wrestles with such overwhelming temptations and his own, personal remorse, the statue behind
the altar seemingly comes to life. The human figures begin to move: a man in the statue opens his eyes;
a woman reaches out, beckoning to Lomax. As Milton's tirade against the Almighty escalates, the
figures begin to embrace one another sexually, the statue bursting into flames, until finally... No, I
won't ruin the ending.
{3) The scene is undeniably effective. Pacino is, well, Al Pacino. He delivers one of the finest and most
chilling portrayals of Satan ever performed on screen. 2] Director Taylor Hachford's use of computer
effects to animate the penthouse statue is exemplary in that it accentuates Pacino's delivery without
detracting from it. In all, the use of this artistic backdrop with its technological morphing was a valuable
contribution to the film. [ It was also a theft.
{4} Frederick Hart is a sculptor who, for over twenty years, has created widely acclaimed works for
public and private collections, including The Creation Sculptures at the Washington National Cathedral,
Three Soldiers at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, Veil of Light, The Angel, and many other works
portraying "figurative beauty" and "spiritual enlightenment." 41Hart, a devout Catholic, draws from the
Divine for much of his inspiration. Of all his works, however, one piece stands alone as Hart's most
intensely spiritual, most inspired creation. Ex Nihilo [WJ is a massive bas-relief sculpture which adorns
the Washington National Cathedral. IQ The awe-inspiring work which depicts eight human figures, eyes
shut, emerging from a void took Hart thirteen years to complete. [7] Beyond the physical effort and
artistic talent which the work obviously embodies, Ex Nihilo represents Frederick Hart's own spiritual
and theological search for the Divine. W Many regard the work as his masterpiece.
(5) By no coincidence, the shape-changing sculpture portrayed in "The Devil's Advocate" is nearly
identical to Hart's Ex Nihilo. The designer consulted a photograph of Ex Nihilo in constructing the prop
for the movie. M Not long after the film's release, an onslaught of letters expressing outrage at the
sacrilegious use of Hart's work ensued. 121O] Their outrage was genuine. Hart himself stated that the
movie "desecrated his work." [.
(6} Eventually, Frederick Hart would instigate a lawsuit against the film's producers. FrederickE. Hart
v. Warner Bros. was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. [12] In
his complaint, Hart, who possessed a copyright for Ex Nihilo, argued that the use of his work in "The
Devil's Advocate" violated his copyright and trademark rights. 13] A decision as to the merits of his
claim will forever remain beyond the reach of any earthly court, however, as the case promptly
settled. [14]
17) Yet, it is hard to resist speculating what the outcome might have been. No doubt, Warner Bros.'
attorneys would have raised a litany of defenses: the prop, digitally enhanced, was not sufficiently
similar to Ex Nihilo; or that using the sculpture was a form of parody and allowable as a fair use of a
copyrighted work. However, their strongest argument would surely have been that any appropriation of
Hart's copyrighted work was so minimal as to preclude any restitution. 115] Although resembling Ex
Nihilo, the bas-relief featured in "The Devil's Advocate" was only a de minimis taking of Frederick
Hart's masterpiece, and therefore was not actionable, or so their argument might have gone.
(8) Hart's story and the issues it raises pose a vexing problem. When is copyright infringement only
minimal? This question becomes all the more complicated when the medium through which the
infringement is broadcast is television or film. In the era of digital and computer special effects, a work

of art may be duplicated and then inverted, colorized, morphed, or blurred into a completely different
form. L6 Computer animation can bring an artist's statue to life. Skillful camera shots and film editing
can frame an author's work of art within a scene so that a viewer never consciously recognizes its
presence. Do these actions constitute de minimis (non-actionable) infringements of authors' copyrights,
or are they something more? And more importantly, what policies can be effectuated to improve
enforcement of copyright infringements occurring in film while minimizing transaction costs?
{9} The courts have reached no consensus as to when an unauthorized use in this area of copyright is
merely de minimis. No set or arbitrary standard exists. A de minimis use in one court might offend
another court. This article will discuss the de minimis doctrine in light of its current (and often varied)
application in several important cases. While the focus will remain on infringements occurring in
electronic media, the application of the analysis is by no means limited to that area alone. The article
concludes by proposing the addition of a notice rule within the current copyright scheme. This rule
would bar a would-be infringer [17] from raising a de minimis defense once access to the copyrighted
work at issue has been conclusively proven. The notice rule would encourage early negotiation of an
optimal licensing arrangement between an infringer and a copyright holder.
II. THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHTS AND INFRINGEMENTS

The Congress shall have Power ... to promote the Progressof Science and
useful Arts, by securingfor limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings andDiscoveries.
- U.S. CONSTITUTION, art. I, § 8, cl. 8
{10} Nimmer states that the grant of a copyright iLUJ is predicated upon the premise that the public will
benefit from the creative efforts of authors. [19 Granting copyright protection - in effect, a limited
monopoly over the work - is necessary to maximize these creative efforts, thereby maximizing the
resulting public benefit. ].__ American copyright protection, therefore, endeavors to encourage
creativity by allowing an author to reap economic benefits from his work. [21] At the same time, the
law's protection is not absolute - a copyright only exists for the lifetime of the author plus seventy
years [22] - so that new creations, building upon others' prior work, may flourish. 2.1J
(11) Copyright protection can extend to "[w]orks of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression." [24] In no case, however, will copyright protection apply to an idea, in and of itself. [251
The law protects the author's expression, not the underlying idea. [26] For artistic works, such as
paintings and sculptures, the owner of a copyright secures exclusive rights to reproduce the work, create
derivative works based upon the original, distribute copies of the work (by sale, transfer, rental, lease, or
loan), and display the work publicly. [27] Yet within the ambit of these rights, copyright protection is
never absolute. Voluminous case law surrounding copyright infringements and various exceptions has
resulted.
{12} Arnstein v. Porter,128] a seminal copyright infringement case, laid out a concise standard to
determine when an infringer's taking or copying of an author's copyrighted work constitutes an
actionable infringement. [29] In Arnstein, the plaintiff, Ira Arnstein, had written, published, and
registered copyrights for several popular songs. [30] Alleging that seven of the defendant's piano
compositions plagiarized his works, Mr. Arnstein sought one million dollars in damages arising from the
infringements. [31] The trial court dismissed the action, granting summary judgment for the
defendant. 3_2] Upon review, the Second Circuit announced a two-part test to gauge the sufficiency of a
plaintiffs claim of copyright infringement. [3 To prevail, a copyright owner must show that:

1. the defendant copied from plaintiffs copyrighted work; and
2. the defendant's copying constituted unlawful appropriation. 3L4]
Applying this test, the Second Circuit held that summary judgment for the defendant was inappropriate
and remanded the case for further proceedings. [5]
{13) The first part of the test obviously presupposes copyright ownership. [36] That is, the plaintiff
must, in fact, possess a valid copyright on the work at issue. [3] The court further explained that
evidence of copying may consist of either the defendant's own admission that he copied or
circumstantial evidence which would tend to prove that the defendant had access to the copyrighted
work. [38] Ultimately, the trier of facts must conclude that, based on the proffered evidence, copying
can be reasonably inferred. [9] Moreover, expert testimony regarding the sufficiency of the similarities
toward proof of copying can be admitted to assist the trier of facts. [40]
{14} Once copying has been established, the second issue of unlawful appropriation arises. [41] A
plaintiff must show that the defendant's copying constituted an unlawful appropriation (an "illicit"
copying) of the plaintiffs work. R2] In light of the facts confronted by the court in Arnstein, the trier
must determine: "[W]hether defendant took from plaintiffs works so much of what is pleasing to the
ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed, that
defendant wrongfully appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff." [3] Expert testimony
becomes irrelevant for proving the second prong of the Arnstein test, because this part of the inquiry
only considers "[T]he response of the ordinary lay hearer." 1441
{15) The two-part infringement test announced in Arnstein reappeared five days later in Heim v.
UniversalPicturesCo. [U5] In Heim, a Hungarian musician sued Universal Pictures for infringing the
copyright to his song, "Ma Este Meg Boldog Vagyok," within one of the studio's movies. [46] Echoing
the earlier decision in Arnstein, Judge Frank described two separate facts which a plaintiff in a copyright
infringement action must prove to prevail: first, that the defendant copied from the plaintiffs work;
second, that this copying was so "material" or "substantial" that it constituted unlawful
appropriation. [47] Unlike Arnstein, however, the focus in Heim resided on the first prong of the test whether copying had, in fact, occurred. 1481 Satisfied with the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff
failed to prove either that Universal had access to or actually copied the plaintiffs song, the Second
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. [49]
{16} Since the middle of the century, this two-pronged standard has served as the starting point, and
often the dispositive inquiry, for a plethora of copyright infringement cases in a variety of contexts such
as alleged infringements of computer programs, [50] molds for lawn decorations, [51] a book title, 5[2J
a children's television show, [53] television commercials, [5J] songs, L15 and even exercise
equipmen. [56] Although the application of this test seems relatively straightforward, confusion, rather
than clarity, resulted. [57] In addition, some courts flatly rejected parts of the Arnstein holding. [58]
{17) Subsequent holdings revealed semantic disputes lurking underneath different courts' applications of
the test. For example, as a practical matter, a plaintiff would normally offer the same evidence (of
similarities) to satisfy both parts of the Arnstein test. In a given '-ase, certain similarities between two
works may establish proof of copying under the first prong of the Arnstein test. However, these same
similarities might not necessarily rise to the level of an unlawful appropriation. Many courts struggled
with this distinction, failing to clarify which part of the test they were examining when considering
similarities between two works. [59]
{18} Finally, the unlawful appropriation prong of the Arnstein test is particularly contentious. As Judge

Hand observed, infringement is, by necessity, an ad hoc decision. [60 Demonstrating that a defendant's
copying is substantial enough to meet the illicitness threshold under Arnstein often becomes little more
than an exercise in line-drawing. The infringer will always argue that his appropriation of an author's
work falls below the threshold level of substantial similarity necessary to prove that his copying was
unlawful.
III. THE DE MINIMIS DEFENSE
Little strokesfell great oaks.
- Benjamin Franklin
(19) Within copyright jurisprudence, the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex M1 frequently appears.
Simply stated, a de minimis use of another's copyrighted work is one that is so trivial, it does not
constitute an actionable infiingement. [62] But to fully understand the intricacies of this doctrine, which
belie this cursory definition, it is necessary to see the doctrine in action. In that regard, no better
opportunity for study exists than an examination of how different courts have wrestled with applying the
de minimis doctrine to various copyright cases.
{20} Before venturing into the myriad applications of the de minimis doctrine, however, one should first
consider the nature or similarities that can exist between two works of art. In other words, what causes
the attributes of a particular painting, or story, or sculpture, to be similarto another? Generally speaking,
similarities can be delineated into two broad categories in copyright infringements: comprehensive,
nonliteral similarities and fragmented, literal similarities. [63 The remainder of this article will
generally focus on the latter category, where actual pieces of a copyrighted work are duplicated and
incorporated, in some form, into another work.
(21) Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc. [64] illustrates one court's attempt to structure a workable de
minimis standard. 65] In Woods, the plaintiff, Lebbeus Woods, had created a pencil drawing entitled,
"NeoMechanical Tower (Upper) Chamber," depicting a high-ceiling chamber, a chair mounted into one
wall, and a sphere suspended by a metal frame in front of the chair. [6 The work was published within
a copyrighted compilation of Woods' drawings in 1992. [67] In 1995, Universal City Studios released
the movie, "12 Monkeys." [68 In an opening scene (and three subsequent scenes)of the movie, the
film's protagonist is brought into a room and seated in a chair attached to a wall as a sphere descends
from a metal armature. 69] The film's director admittedly studied a copy of Woods' book in designing
the scene, and discussed the "Upper Chamber" drawing with the producer and production designer. [70
Upon viewing the movie, Woods promptly filed a claim and moved to preliminarily enjoin Universal
City Studios from portraying the scenes which included "Upper Chamber." [71] Universal countered
that the allegedly infringing footage in "12 Monkeys" accounted for less than five minutes of a 130minute movie. [7_2
{22) The court noted a laundry list of similarities between the scenes depicted in "12 Monkeys" and
Woods' "Upper Chamber." [73] Rejecting Universal's de minimis argument, the court stated the
proposition: "Whether an infringement is de minimis is determined by the amount taken without
authorization from the infringed work, and not by the characteristics of the infringing work." [74]
Applied, the test appears almost mechanical: Universal copied a "substantial amount" of Woods'
drawing; therefore, they could not contend that it was only a de minimis taking. [75
(23) The Woods test focuses entirely on the infringer's act of appropriation vis-i-vis the copyrighted
work. By necessity, this preoccupation with the original work comes at the exclusion of other, arguably

pertinent, considerations. For instance, what if Universal Studios included the infringing chamber-scene
for a total of only sixty seconds in "12 Monkeys?" Alternatively, what if Universal (the director having
decided that the scene setting should be minimized) had distorted, or blurred the chamber-scene,
rendering it either partially or completely distinguishable from Woods' drawing? One might intuitively
feel that situations such as these should also amount to non-actionable, de minimis takings. Yet, under
the Woods test, the manner in which an infringer chooses to include a copyrighted work into his
infringing work is of no consequence. The infringer cannot escape liability no matter how trivial the use
of the copyrighted work. In the wake of Woods, a plaintiff, having proven access and copying of his
work, has, in actuality, proven most of his case. [76] Other courts have disagreed with this approach.
{24) In Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., [77] the defendant, Black Entertainment
Television (BET) re-broadcast an episode of HBO's "ROC," a television sitcom depicting a middleclass, African-American family. [78] In one scene of the episode at issue, the set decoration included a
poster of a Sunday school picnic with various African-American idioms interposed in twelve panels
surrounding the picture. [79] The poster was, in fact, a print reproduction of a "story quilt" created and
copyrighted by Faith Ringgold. [80]
{25} HBO and BET defended their use of the poster on several grounds, including that the poster's
portrayal was only a de minimis use of Ringgold's work. [81 Reversing the district court's summary
judgment for the defendants, the Second Circuit considered three categories of de minimis
infringements: a technical violation of a trivial, legal right; a copying which falls below the quantitative
threshold of substantial similarity; and lastly, as a relevant consideration in conjunction with a fair use
defense. 82] The court reasoned that the first category, by its own definition, would hardly ever be
litigated, while the third category is not properly a component of a fair use analysis. [83] Substantial
similarity, therefore, becomes the sole analytical concept for de minimis copyright infringements.
{26} Substantial similarity requires "[T]hat the copying is quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to
support the legal conclusion that infringement (actionable copying) has occurred." [84 The court
forcefully rejected BET's contention that Ringgold's expression could not be discerned in the scene clearly, the poster was recognizable to a lay observer, and marked, qualitative similarities existed despite
convoluting camera shots. [_8] As to the quantitative aspects of similarity, the court conceded that the
nine segments in which the poster appeared were for a short duration of time taken individually, but
noted their "repetitive effect." [86] Interestingly, the court drew an analogy between the duration of the
infringing segments with the statutory provisions setting licensing fees imposed on public broadcasters
to use published pictorial or visual works. [87] Ultimately, the court held that the infringing use of the
poster was, in quantitative and qualitative terms, substantially similar (an actionable infringement) to
Ms. Ringgold's copyrighted work. [8
{27} The holding in Ringgold focused entirely on the manner in which BET used the poster in the
"ROC" episode. [89] In sharp contrast to Woods, therefore, Ringgold stands for the proposition that
courts must look to the defendant's infringing use when considering a de minimis defense. The character
of the final, infringing product decides the defendant's fate. Under a Ringgold analysis, a complete
appropriation (an exact duplicate, for example) of a copyrighted work may still fall under the rubric of
"de minimis use," as long as it is minimally utilized or indiscernible within the infringing work.
{28} Moreover, the court in Ringgold flirts with the idea of establishing an arbitrary, bright-line standard
of de minimis copying. Its application of the "quantitative" portion of the analysis is somewhat
revealing:
From the standpoint of a quantitative assessment of the segments, the principal
four-to-five second segment in which almost all of the poster is clearly visible,

albeit in less than perfect focus, reinforced by the briefer segments in which
smaller portions are visible, all totaling 26 to 27 seconds, are not de minimis
copying.[90]
The lengthy discussion comparing the public broadcasters' regulations (royalties are paid based, in part,
on whether the duration of the broadcaster's use of a piece of art is longer than three seconds) with the
sitcom's use of the story quilt further illustrates this point. [91] Whatever conclusions may be divined
from the Ringgold holding, one tenet seems clear: an unauthorized, clearly visible copying which lasts
for longer than twenty-seven seconds is not a de minimis use. Whether the court intended a narrow
application of its holding, or if, in fact, the court has embarked upon a process of establishing de
minimis benchmarks, leaving others to fill in the gaps as new cases arise, is certainly a debatable point.
{29) A year later, the Second Circuit was afforded an opportunity to reapply and expand the Ringgold
analysis under a similar set of facts. In Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., the plaintiff, Jorge Antonio
Sandoval created and copyrighted a series of black and white, self-portrait photographs. L92] The
defendant, New Line Cinema, produced and distributed the motion picture, "Seven," a suspense movie
In a scene approximately one hour and seventeen minutes into the movie, ten
about a serial killer. LU93[
photographs briefly appeared for a total of 35.6 seconds. [94] The district
Sandoval's
reproductions of
court ruled that no actionable infringement occurred as New Line's inclusion of the photographs in one
scene of the movie for such a brief time was an allowable fair use of Sandoval's work. [95
(30) The court in Sandoval ruled that an infringing work must fall below a quantitative threshold of
similarity. [96] This quantitative threshold comprises the amount of the copyrighted work that was
copied and the observability of the copyrighted work within the infringing work. [97] Observability, in
turn, consists of both the length of time in which the copyrighted work appears in the infringing work
and its "prominence" within the infringing work. ["8 Furthermore, the prominence of a copyrighted
work is a function of lighting and the placement or positioning of the copyrighted work within the
infringing work. [99] With that in mind, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, but
repudiated its fair use analysis, holding, as a matter of law, that New Line's use of the photographs was
de minimis. [100]
{31) The court in Sandoval is trying to create a "picture" of a true de minimis infringement: it requires a
certain quantitative level of copying; the copying must be observable; it must be featured prominently
within the infringing work. [1 Perhaps the court is struggling to invoke, by way of a formulaic
approach, its own notion of what constitutes a de minimis infringement for future courts to reference for
their analyses. By defining the parameters of a garden-variety, de minimis infringement, the Sandoval
court furnishes a standard with which one can compare any unique factual circumstances surrounding a
copyright infringement. Clarifying the standard, however, creates another problem: it thrusts the judge
into the role of a film or art critic. Under the extensive determinations required in a Sandoval analysis, a
judge must take notice not only of the similarities between two works (possibly occurring in different
mediums), but also a copy's "prominence" within an infringing work [02] The judge must determine
the effect of lighting and placement on a work of art. [103] The question arises: Should a court make
such determinations - findings which may be highly subjective and affected by one's tastes and
preferences - to determine the validity of a defendant's de minimis defense? [L04
(32) The above holdings illustrate a spectrum of de minimis rules ranging from the vigorous, judicial
activism seen in Sandoval to the minimalist judicial analysis described by the Woods test. The former
turns judge into art critic; the latter illustrates a "hands-off' approach, relegating the court to the single
determination of whether or not an infringer substantially copied the plaintiffs work.
133) Still other courts have announced alternative methods of gauging the substantiality of an infringer's

appropriation. In Fisher v. Dees, the Ninth Circuit framed its de minimis test around whether an "[A]
verage audience would recognize the appropriation." [1 In the context of video games, the Seventh
Circuit focused on the value of the copyrighted material, holding that the test for de minimis copying is:
"[W]hether the accused work is so similar to the plaintiffs work that an ordinary reasonable person
would conclude that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff s protectible expression by
taking material of substance and value." [.106] In contrast, another court considered the value of the
appropriated material encompassed within the infringing work - an infringing work which would be
substantially less valuable absent the copied material would lie beyond the de minimis threshold. [107
(34} The substantial copying prong of the Arnstein test, deceptively simple in appearance, has unleashed
a morass of contradicting tests and confused applications. Each holding betrays the court's
predisposition towards an active (or passive) role in determining similarities between works, and, by
implication, the allocation of intellectual property rights. Certainly, each of these de minimis tests
possess merit.
(35) One could marshal scores of convincing arguments and counter-arguments favoring any of these
rules. The concept of a minimal, non-actionable copyright infringement is difficult to annunciate, much
less create a consensus about it. And yet, if indeed the goal of copyright protection of an author's work is
to encourage creativity in the market place of ideas without stifling those "creative forces" by
overprotection, some kind of line must be drawn. [108] Which line of reasoning best advances the
balance of interests embodied in American copyright law? I say none of the above.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A NOTICE REQUIREMENT
Behold, how good and how pleasant it isfor brethren to dwell together in
unity!
-

Psalm 133:1, KJV

(36) In his watershed article, The Problem of Social Cost, Professor Coase shed new light upon an old
problem utilizing microeconomic analysis. [09 Coase characterized the situation where a firm's
productive activities which inadvertently cause harmfulside effects (externalities[l110]), as being
reciprocal in nature: A's productive activities may cause harm to B's property; but B's restraint of A's
production will, in turn, harm A. [_] That being the case, the ultimate allocation of property rights
between competing uses (A's production versus B's use)-will normally be independent of a court's initial
assignment of those rights. [112] Under this theory, a court should only allocate property rights between
competing uses when the increase in the productive value resulting from the reallocation is greater than
the costs incurred to bring about the reallocation. [113]
(37) In Coase's view, the courts, in effect, should become economic maximizers - catalysts to expedite
parties toward an efficient, optimal allocation of competing property rights. This merger between
traditional, legal analysis and microeconomic efficiency considerations (generally referred to as "law
and economics") has been applied to diverse areas of the law, such as: criminal justice, contract law,
landlord-tenant law, tort principles, antitrust, environmental law, and race discrimination. [L14] Law and
economics has left its mark on intellectual property as well. In recent years, economic analysis has
become a paramount component of copyright jurisprudence. [15] The remainder of this article will
incorporate this philosophy, applying economic analysis toward the problem of de minimis copying. [
(38) Bearing in mind Coase's idea of reciprocity, [117] let us return to the scenario presented at the
outset of this article. By copying Ex Nihilo and utilizing it in a manner that, at the very least, was

contrary to the artist's wishes, Warner Bros. inflicted a kind of injury to Frederick Hart. Whether the
injury was to the integrity of his art or actual pecuniary damages, it makes no difference at present.
Suppose that the case proceeded to trial, and the district court granted a permanent injunction,
forbidding Warner Bros. from using any likeness of Ex Nihilo within "The Devil's Advocate." [118 To
comply with the court's order, Warner Bros. would have to either reshoot the offending scenes in which
Ex Nihilo appeared, or digitally remove the sculpture's likeness from the actual film. Either alternative
would entail extensive, additional costs for the studio. In a certain sense, Frederick Hart will be
inflicting harm on Warner Bros. by enforcing his copyright. [119
{39) This reciprocal harm which both Universal and Mr. Hart necessarily inflict upon one another by
litigating the right to use Ex Nihilo's likeness could have been altogether avoided, and an optimal
appropriation agreed upon long before the final shooting of "The Devil's Advocate." 120] Like any
rational decision maker, [121] Warner Bros., no doubt, well considered the possibility of
litigation. [12J2 In reaching their decision to incorporate a bas-relief nearly identical to Hart's work, the
studio would have estimated their cost as being the liability for the copyright infringement tempered by
the likelihood that no one would ever discover the similarities (or alternatively, that Mr. Hart would not
be inclined to file a law suit). [1 Balancing this perceived cost of using the work without
authorization against the added value which the prop contributed to the quality of the film, Warner Bros.
"rolled the dice," pressing ahead in the face of possible liability. As previously discussed, the district
court in Virginia would have been afforded a plethora of alternative tests, standards, and factors with
which to gauge the level of the illicitness of Warner Bros.' appropriation. [1241 The court would have to
decide who will possess the right to briefly utilize a digitally enhanced likeness of Hart's Ex Nihilo
within a movie. And therein lies the gravamen of the problem.
{40) Under the current regime, the allocation of rights between author and alleged infringer of a
copyright becomes a question for either a judge or a jury to decide. In instances where the alleged
infringement is arguably de minimis, a court of law is a terribly inefficient fiat to accomplish any kind of
allocation between competing copyright uses. [1251 This seems especially poignant when one considers
the fundamental question which a plaintiff/author calls upon a court to answer in a copyright
infringement case: that is, whether the defendant's work is substantially similar to the plaintiffs
own. [126] By ceding the entire allocative function to an outside party, the process of allocation
becomes nothing more than a reflection of one particular judge or jury's subjective opinion - an
indeterminable and unqualifiable belief that the defendant either appropriated or did not appropriate too
much of the author's work. 1127] Given the subjective, if not metaphysical, nature of similarities that can
exist between two works, any availability of "expert" guidance to assist the trier of fact is, in reality, of
limited practical value. [128]
(41) On the other hand, who better to determine a minimal (acceptable) use of a copyrighted work than
the parties themselves? After all, they alone are in the best position to quantify their respective
incentives. If, in fact, both parties harm one another by competing for the use of the expression, who else
could best measure the extent of their respective injury in order to reach a mutually agreeable solution?
And most importantly, both sides of any dispute possess a natural, pre-existing incentive to cease the
harm which they endure. In that light, the true goal of copyright infringement resolution becomes clear:
to bring the parties together, as early as possible, in order to quantify their respective positions. [129
The director, before shooting an "infringing" scene, could then demonstrate to the author exactly how
the movie would utilize the author's expression. [30] The author, in turn, could object to those uses he
finds objectionable, and together, the director and the author might arrive at a consensus and bypass the
need to litigate entirely.
(42) However, so long as the chance remains that a court will simply pigeon-hole an allegedly
infringing use as being de minimis, a director retains the incentive to "shoot first and ask questions

later." All the more so since the author will often be in the dark regarding any appropriations of his
work. M131] It is little wonder that under the current application of the de minimis use doctrine,
Frederick Hart first saw an exact likeness of his work being set ablaze on a movie screen in a public
theater. [132]
{43) To rectify the inherent confusion between the courts and end their interminable struggle to define
"substantial similarity" in copyright infringement cases, while simultaneously facilitating a timely and
productive meeting between copyright owners and those who desire to appropriate portions of the
owner's protected expression, LL33 I propose the following rule:
Once access or actual copying has been conclusively proven, a defendant is
barred from raising a de minimis use defense unless he has, prior to the
appropriation. provided the copyright owner adequate notice regarding the
intended use. [ 134]
{44) As a conceptual matter, this rule would eliminate the second prong of the Arnstein test unless the
infringer, who consciously appropriates a portion of an author's work, first notifies the author. [13J5 Any
substantial similarity comparison only becomes necessary if the author has received notice LLU6 or, at
trial, is unable to prove that the defendant actually copied the author's work. [13J7 I anticipate three
important and positive effects upon future copyright disputes following the implementation of such a
rule. First, the rule obviously provides authors greater notice and information about appropriations of
their copyrighted works occurring in the market. [138] Second, the rule encourages early negotiation
between authors and infringers, thereby promoting the optimal use of copyrights. [9
Along this same
line of thought, it would also remove a court's subjectivity and arbitrary line-drawing in the clear
instances when a defendant copied whole portions of an author's work. [1U0 Finally, the rule provides
authors with greater leverage over the use of their expressions, especially in cases where an infringer
deliberately incorporates entire parts of the author's expression.
(45) Under this proposed rule, infringers who consult, study, or preview an author's copyrighted work
and subsequently utilize some protected likeness of the work for their own use without notifying the
author have per se infringed the author's copyright. Any subsequent adjudication begins and ends with
the sole inquiry: Did the defendant copy the plaintiffs work? [41 Of course, the author might still have
to present evidence of similarities between the defendant's work and his own. In cases where the author
is unable to conclusively prove access or copying, he would have to rely on evidence of similarities
between the work to establish an actionable infringement. [42] However, a court would not need to
perform the analytical acrobatics required under prior case law to characterize these similarities as
substantial or illicit. [143]
{46) That being the case, an author is much more likely to succeed on the merits of his case and with far
greater expediency. This fact will alter the incentives and subsequent behavior of infringers. [144] In
short, the rule forecloses the possibility for an infringer to surreptitiously infringe, subsequently go to
trial, and ultimately retain the appropriated parts of the author's expression merely because the taking
did not rise to the level of a particular court's notion of unlawful infringement. By significantly reducing
the element of chance (that a court will consider the use to be de minimis) from the infringer's costbenefit calculation of whether or not to infringe, this rule would create an incentive on the part of the
infringer to negotiate with the author before the infringement occurs. [45] Realizing this increased
probability of infringement liability, the infringer will likely comply with the rule and attempt to
minimize his costs at negotiation rather than at trial - he will notify the author before using the work.
Therefore, authors, in general, will receive greater and more detailed notice regarding the use of their
works under this rule.

(47) This rule would also promote facilitation of the negotiation process between authors and infringers.
Having received notice, the author (assuming he does not simply acquiesce to the proposed use of his
protected work), will contact the infringer and the process of determining a mutually agreeable use of
the work could begin. [L146] As previously discussed, the author and the infringer are ideally suited to
determine the optimal use of the author's protected expression. [147] By eliminating a court's
subjectiveness and artistic judgment while simultaneously streamlining the assignment of property rights
between competing uses, this rule ensures a robust market of creative works and decreased litigation.
Authors and infringers can quantify their respective values and incentives to one another in an amicable
environment without the hostility associated with litigation. LiA8
(48) Finally, this rule affords copyright owners a certain amount of leverage in the negotiation process
that may work to level the playing field, so to speak. Returning to the Hart/Warner Bros. dispute,
suppose the two parties actually engaged in mediation, perhaps by order of the district court. Their
relative bargaining strength would be hopelessly skewed to the detriment of Mr. Hart. 19] By
increasing Hart's likelihood of success in the event of litigation, however, Hart comes to the table in a
much stronger position. Therefore, copyright owners, in general, will be able to engage in meaningful
negotiations - possessing a relatively equal bargaining strength - with infringers under this rule.
(49) This rule is not wholly without legal precedent. True, the notice requirement is a novel gloss, but
the elimination of Arnstein's substantial similarity requirement in cases of obvious copying is an idea
that has, at least in one case, been embraced by the Fourth Circuit. In M Kramer ManufacturingCo.,
Inc. v. Andrews, the Court of Appeals considered an electronic game manufacturer's copyright
infringement claim regarding its video poker game. [150] Access to the video game had been clearly
established, but the district court found that because the defendants used different phraseology in their
game's audiovisual presentations, altered the video playing cards, affixed the letters, "LE" to the card
backs, and inserted, "Lynch Enterprises, Inc." into one of the modes in their video game, substantial
similarity did not exist between the two games and no actionable infringement occurred. [15] In an
unheralded decision, the Fourth Circuit rejected the district court's traditional infringement analysis with
a novel, succinct rule. [152] "The district court, however, lost sight of the ultimate issue - whether
Drews Distributing copied the plaintiffs game. If there was clear proof of actual copying by the
defendants, that is the end of the case." [153] Applying this rule, the Court of Appeals held that the
defendants clearly infringed upon the plaintiffs copyright and remanded the case to the district
court. L1 Under Kramer, it would seem the idea of bypassing the substantial similarity analysis in
cases where the defendant clearly accessed and copied a protected work is not so far fetched. [155]
{50) At least one commentator has dismissed the Kramer holding as an "unprecedented assertion" in
copyright jurisprudence. [1561 Unprecedented or not, Kramer marks an admirable attempt to establish
one bright-line rule in an area rife with conflicting holdings and arbitrary standards. [57] Moreover, it
exemplifies, by implication, a holding that is parallel with a central, underlying tenet of the proposed
notice rule: the elimination of the substantial similarity requirement in copyright infringement cases
once copying has been conclusively established. [58] Conceivably, the Fourth Circuit might embrace
such a rule as a natural extension to its decision in Kramer, if afforded the opportunity.
V. CONCLUSION
When they saw so many ridiculous,ramshackle institutions,survivals of an
earlierage, which no one had attempted to co-ordinate or to adjust to modern
conditions...
- Alexis De Tocqueville

{51} Confusion, disconnected reasoning, conflicting holdings: today, these are the hallmark
characteristics of de minimis use analysis within many copyright infringement cases. Branding an
appropriation as either de minimis versus an actionable infringement is a subjective task which an
objective and impartial court is poorly suited to accomplish. Each test, whether a simple, quantitative
measurement as in Woods, or an intricate, multi-layered series of artistic inquiries as in Sandoval,
presents serious drawbacks. Indeed, the various de minimis tests which have arisen in the world of
copyright jurisprudence seem to have formulated ex nihilo - over time, their acceptance or rejection
within a jurisdiction becomes little more than a mantric recitation of precedence with little, if any,
consideration of their broader policy implications. To end this conceptual quagmire, the problem of de
minimis use and copyright infringement, in general, must be examined in a new light.
152) The nature of the infringement problem is reciprocal. In the advent of modem digital effects, the
infringer, having access to almost any artistic work's likeness, possesses a carte blanche ability to lift,
augment, distort, or destroy that likeness within his own work by simply pushing a button. He harms the
author by appropriating this protected expression without compensating the author for the work. On the
other hand, an author stifles the future development of creative works, preventing others from building
upon the author's prior work, by rigorously enforcing his copyright. If both parties were brought together
before the copyrighted expression became incorporated into the infringer's work, they could reach a
mutually agreeable solution for the optimal use of the work. Additionally, the expense and time of
litigation could be circumvented, or at least relegated to situations where the two parties reach an
impasse.
(53) From this, a central goal of copyright law seems clear: to encourage and provide incentives for the
pre-litigation negotiation between authors and infringers. Together, the parties could quantify the value
of a contemplated appropriation or determine whether a proposed use is merely de minimis. To
accomplish this goal, the law must first remove the incentive from infringers to surreptitiously
appropriate copyrighted expression in the hope that a court will subsequently wink at such a taking,
excusing it as a de minimis use. The law must also provide some kind of mechanism to apprize
copyright owners of the various appropriations of their respective works which occur, from time to time,
in the outside world. Finally, to promote this goal, the law must ensure that the negotiation process will
be meaningful and fair.
{54) Therefore, to meet these requirements and promote the optimal use of copyrighted expressions in
the United States, this article proposes the rule:
Once access or actual copying has been conclusively proven, a defendant is
barred from raising a de minimis use defense unless he has, prior to the
appropriation, provided the copyright owner adequate notice regarding the
intended use.
I believe the implementation of this rule would neatly accomplish the balance of interests (protecting
authors' creative expressions without quelling future creative works based on prior art) which American
copyright law endeavors to strike. It divorces the roles of judge and art critic; the adjudicator would no
longer need to foray into the art expert's province. It encourages parties to resolve their own differences
within an artistic world that spans from the classic mediums of stone and paint to the cutting edge of
computer image effects in film. Finally, the rule promotes efficiency - efficient use of the courts,
efficient use of authors' and infringers' resources, and ultimately, the efficient use of a copyrighted
expression. Perhaps in the future, the Frederick Harts of the world could spend more of their time
creating great art, and less time litigating it.
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See THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE (Warner Bros. Pictures 1997).

£2.

The reviews of the movie, however, were mixed. See Jay Boyar, Fiendish Fun in Devil's Advocate,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 27, 1998 at 1998 WL 5332581 (writing that although the movie was
"over the top," it was, basically, a film about moral choices); Joan Lau, Fresh Angle to FightBetween
Good and Evil, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 30, 1998 at 1998 WL 3967503 (opining that "The Devil's
Advocate" provided an original angle on the basic, eternal struggle between good and evil, but should
have been five minutes shorter in length); Eileen Condon, Hell of a Good Movie for Keanu,
BIRMINGHAM POST, Jan. 16, 1998 at 1998 WL 22896915 (characterizing Reeves' performance as
"sizzling"); Stephen Schaefer, Turner Wants Warner Bros. On a New Page, BOSTON HERALD, Jan.
16, 1998, S04 at 1998 WL 7334875 (briefly describing "The Devil's Advocate" as a star-filled,
expensive bomb); Craig Kopp, Top Movies of the Year - As Good as '97 Films Get, CINCINNATI
POST, Jan. 1, 1998, 12 at 1998 WL 6165079; Jack Kroll, The Devil's Advocate (movie reviews),
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 27, 1997, 70 at 1997 WL 13931527.
M[3 Apparently, the computer effects were quite expensive as well. Coupled with the high costs of
retaining several accomplished and well-recognized actors (and a New York senator's cameo
appearance), the total price to create THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE exceeded $60,000,000. Unfortunately
for the studio, the movie barely broke even. See Cora Llamas, Film Winners and Losers in 1997, BUS.
DAILY, Feb. 2 1998 at 1998 WL 5444005.
L4 See FrederickHart-Bronze Sculptures, Creation on an Intimate Scale-]98 7-1994, (promotional
material).

51 Ex nihilo: (Latin) out of nothing. The term refers to the theological doctrine that God created the

existing universe out of non-existence - God did not fashion creation out of preexisting material, but
rather from His own, creative power. See JOSEPH STUMP, THE CHRISTIAN FAITH - A SYSTEM
OF DOGMATICS, 63 (Muhlenberg Press 1942).
IQ See Laurence Siskind, The Devil's Advocate, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 23, 1998, at 23.
U71 See id.
81 See id.

[9 See id. Warner Bros.' counsel admitted as much to Hart's attorneys.
[IO See id.

LU Id.
[2 See id.

H3J1

See id.

£141 See id. Moreover, a gag-order was issued preventing disclosure of any details about the case.
[51 By the author's observations, the prop appeared in one scene of THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE.
Framed in various shots (ranging from blurred, background shots to panning closeups), the prop
appeared for 3 minutes, 58 seconds. The total running time for the movie was 144 minutes.

LU6 Besides film entertainment, computer-generated digital effects have made inroads in the areas of
political advertising, photojournalism, and television commercials. See Raphael Winick, Intellectual
Property,Defamation and the DigitalAlteration of Visual Images, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
143-144 (1997).
£_71 Throughout this article, I will make hypothetical references to two sets of persons: appropriators or
infringers on the one hand, and authors, artists, or copyright owners on the other. The former includes
any person or group that takes any portion of a copyrighted work not their own without authorization
and ..::lizes it in some manner. The latter is the possessor of a copyright on some kind of original work.
In that regard, "infringer" may be somewhat misleading in that the appropriation might not rise to the
level of an actionable copyright infringement. However, I believe I have kept the meanings clear in the
contexts in which I use them. Additionally, since much of the case law included in this article involves a
movie producer or director's alleged infringement of another's copyrighted work, and as that scenario
easily lends itself to the type of analysis necessary to discuss some of the points I will make, some
hypotheticals will simply use the terms "director" and "author." The reader may assume that in those
instances, the director is also an infringer and the author is a copyright owner. I trust this will not create
too much confusion.

asi As exclusive rights, the rights to reproduction, display, adaptation, publication, and performance,

create the "bundle of rights" known as a copyright. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976), reprintedin 17
U.S.C.A. § 106 (1996) at 139.

Ii9

See MELVILLE B. AND DAVID NIMMER, I NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] (1998).
European copyright law, by way of contrast, generally reflects the philosophy that an author's copyright
or property interest represents an investment of the author's will into the very work itself and as such,
should be protected. See Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism,Economics, and the DroitMoral, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 7 (1997).

J See 1 NIMMER, supra note 19, § 1.03 [A].
See id.
21..

[221 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1999).
2_J Judge Newman provided an illuminating dissertation about the objectives of copyright law in
Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F. 2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (the "Greatest
American Hero" case):
It is a fundamental objective of the copyright law to foster creativity. However,
that law has the capacity both to augment and diminish the prospects for
creativity. By assuring the author of an original work the exclusive benefits of
whatever commercial success his or her work enjoys, the law obviously

promotes creativity. At the same time, it can deter the creation of new works if
authors are fearful that their creations will too readily be found to be
substantially similar to preexisting works.

2]4J See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1999).
[251 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1999).
L26J See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
[271See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1999).
L2[8 154 F. 2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
[L9 Id. at 467.
LLJ See id.

£11 See id.
321 See id.
313 See id. at 468.

134 Id.
I51 See id. at 475.
aJ See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-410 (1999) (detailing the procedural requirements for registering a
U.S. copyright).

LU1 The legitimacy of an author's copyright is often a hotly contested issue in copyright infringement
litigation. See, e.g., Serv. & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680, 688 (4th Cir. 1992)
(considering the originality and, by implication, the validity of a software designer's copyright of a
diagnostic computer program); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 432-442 (4th Cir. 1986)
(deciding whether audiovisuals of a computer poker game were subject to copyright protection);
Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d 128, 132 (8th Cir. 1985) (upholding
the validity of a telephone company's copyright of a telephone directory as an original work of
authorship); Montgomery County Ass'n of Realtors v. Realty Photo Master Corp., 878 F.Supp. 804, 809
(D. Md. 1995) (deciding whether a database containing real estate listings was entitled to copyright
protection); Ganz Bros. Toys v. Midwest Importers of Cannon Falls, Inc., 834 F.Supp. 899, 900 (E.D.
Va. 1993) (deciding whether modified mouse figurines were derivative works or original, copyrightable
works of art); Douglas v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 1992 WL 382340, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (considering
whether a previously published package design picture which did not contain a copyright notice could
be subsequently registered for copyright protection).

[L81 See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
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1401 See id.
[411 See id.

41A2I See id.
J3 Id. at 473.

44 Id. at 468. See also, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 70 (2d
Cir. 1999) (applying an "ordinary observer" test to determine copyright infringement of various news
articles); Zen Music, Inc. v. CVS Corp., 1999 WL 605462, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (applying an "average
lay observer" standard to determine substantial similarity).
[4U5 Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 487 (2d Cir. 1946).
4See id. at 481. The infringement allegedly occurred in "Perhaps," a song included in Universal
Picture's movie, "Nice Girl."
I47J See id. at 487 (citing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1946)).

L_]8 See Heim, 154 F.2d at 487.
L4 % See id. at 487-488. Both courts appear to have been persuaded by expert testimony demonstrating
that Mr. Heim and the composer of "Perhaps" had, in the course of composing their respective works,
independently utilized a commonplace musical theme by Dvorak.
[L5JQ See Whelan Assoc. Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab. Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3d Cir. 1986); Mfr. Tech.,
Inc. v. Cams, Inc., 706 F.Supp. 984, 1000 (D. Conn. 1989).
15Jl See Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 608 (1st Cir. 1998).

I521 See Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1986).
L3J See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod. Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.
1977).
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4J See Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F.Supp. 1353, 1357 (N.D. Ill. 1989).

I5155See Repp v. Webber, 947 F.Supp. 105, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

[6 See Universal Athletic Shoe Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975). The plaintiff
alleged copyright infringement of its multi-station weight machine and the accompanying exercise wall
chart.
[U7 See Aaron M. Broaddus, Eliminatingthe Confusion:A Restatement of the Testfor Copyright
Infringement, 5 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 43, 68 (1995).

[.J See, e.g., Computer Assoc. Int'l Inc.

v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting the
ordinary observer standard for determining substantial similarity between two works and allowing
expert testimony to assist the fact-finder); Denker v. Uhry, 820 F.Supp. 722, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)

(rejecting Arnstein's "slightest doubt" standard in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate
in a copyright infringement case); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 729 F.Supp. 133, 135 (N.D.
Cal. 1991) (questioning the delineation between an unprotected idea and a copyright protected
expression).
LU9 See generally Alan Latham, ProbativeSimilarity as Proofof Copying: Toward DispellingSome
Myths in CopyrightInfringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187 (1990).

[kJ See PeterPan Fabrics,274 F.2d at 489.
W1] De minimis non curat lex: the law does not care for, or take notice of, very small or trifling matters.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 431 (6th ed. 1990).
62 See Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997).
163J See 4 NIvIMER, supra note 19, § 13.03[A]. The distinction between these two categories might
become more clear by way of a simple illustration: Charles Dickens and William Shakespeare both
wrote in the English language. Both writers, at times, utilized tragic characters, illustrated moral lessons,
and frequently included forbidden or arduous romances between two sympathetic characters within their
respective stories. These are examples of comprehensive, nonliteral similarities. On the other hand,
compare the chorus of "Turn, Turn, Turn.", a song by the Byrds:
"To everything turn, turn, turn; there is a season turn, turn, turn; and a time to
every purpose under heaven."
with Ecclesiastes 3:1:
"To everything there is a season, and a time to every purpose under heaven,"
KJV.
The song's chorus, almost a verbatim quote, would be considered a fragmented, literal similarity to King
Solomon's famous book of wisdom.
6__4J 920 F.Supp 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

L65 Id.
[6 See id. at 63.
J"_7J See id.
61__ See id.

[_ See id at 63-64.
[.1 See id. at 64.

711 See id.

721 See id. at 65.

[73] Both works contained a wall and floor composed of large rectangles creating a grid, a wall with a
worn texture as its surface, a horizontal shelf, and an apron; the chairs in both works are comprised of
rectangular planes, have similar armrests, and etching appears on the chair back; the spheres are
similarly arranged in both works as well. See id. at 64-65.

7LQi Id. at 65.
7[2_U See id.

L71 Cf.M KramerMfg. Co., 783 F.2d at 445 (holding that an actionable infringement is conclusively
proven when there is clear proof of actual copying).
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126 F. 3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997).

J8J Id. at 73.
U9A See id. at 72.

ILQJ Id.
LI See id. at 74. The court found that the poster appeared for an aggregate duration of 26.75 seconds.
In the longest, most pronounced segment, the poster was 80 percent visible, lasting four to five seconds.
See id. at 76.
L&21 See id. at 74-75. The fair use doctrine is a fascinating, somewhat mercurial, aspect of copyright law
which provides defendants an affirmative defense to copyright infringement actions if the infringing use
falls under one of the statutory categories. An extensive overview of the concept is beyond the scope of
this article, but as a cursory summation of the fair use defense, an infringer may use portions of a
copyrighted work within his own work for one of several specified purposes, including: criticism or
comment of the copyrighted work, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research. A court, in
considering a fair use defense, must consider:
1. the purpose of the infringing use (whether commercial or nonprofit);
2. the nature of the copyrighted work;
3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the overall copyrighted
work; and
4. the effect of the use upon the value of or the potential market for the original,
copyrighted work.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1999). For more comprehensive analyses of the various facets of the fair use
defense, See 4 NIMMER, supra note 19, § 13.05; PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 2 COPYRIGHT § 10.2 (2d ed.
1998); WILLIAM F. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW § 107 at 239-255 (6th ed. 1986).
LU3 See id.; See also Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (observing that de minimis
defense and fair use, parody defense are, in analytical terms, mutually exclusive). But see Warner Bros.
v. Am. Broad. Co., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 1983) (incorporating de minimis analysis as part of an
overall fair use analysis in the context of commentaries and parodies).
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Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 75.
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broadcaster must pay a greater royalty to use a "featured" display as opposed to "background" displays.
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L8_1 Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 77.
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reported to the thousandth of a second.
L20J Id. at 77.

[1 See id.

[21 Sandoval v. New

Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 216 (2d Cir. 1998).

93 Id.
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9[2.5 See id. at 217.
LU6 Sandoval, 147 F.3d at 216.
L971 See id.
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[9 See id. (citing Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 75).
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claim. See also, Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 743 (2d Cir. 1991) (concurring opinion
noting that the fair use defense assumes the existence of a copyright infringement).
[101 See generallySandoval, 147 F.3d at 215.
[102] See id. at 216 (citing Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74).
[103 See id.
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L[05] Fisher,794 F.2d at 434 n.2.
[106 Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., 562 F.2d at 1164).
[07] See Igram v. Page, 1999 WL 705895, at *3 (N.D. I11. 1999).
[108 See White v. Samsung Elec. Am. Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that
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[109 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). As a field of social science,
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resources. See WALTER J. WESSELS, ECONOMICS, 1 (2d Ed. 1993).
[L10] See EDGAR K. BROWNING & JACQUELENE M. BROWNING, MICROECONOMIC
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, 664-665 (4th Ed. 1992). Economists commonly refer to harmful (or
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instance, suppose Amalgamated, Inc. is an automobile factory selling cars to Carl, a auto dealer. In the
process of manufacturing, Amalgamated releases pollutants into a lake owned by Bernard, a fisherman
by trade, but not a party to the transaction between Amalgamated and Bernard. As a result of
Amalgamated's car production (and the ensuing pollution), all of the fish in Bernard's lake die. This
example illustrates a kind of externality (an external cost) which causes inefficiency in the market as the
"true cost" (the cost of the inputs to produce the cars, the opportunity cost, and the pollution effects) of
producing an Amalgamated car may not be captured.
[11] See Coase, supra note 109, at 2.
[11 See id. at 2-8. This assumes there are no transaction costs. This theory is commonly referred to as
the "Coase Theorem." Retuming to Bernard's dilemma: Assuming there are no transaction costs and the
parties are free to negotiate, the same amount of polluting activity will result whether Amalgamated is
held liable for the pollution damages or not.
[13 See id. at 15-16.
[114 See WARNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS, AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS, 4
(3d ed. 1999).
[15 See Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me? Notes on Market Failureand the Parody
Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305, 306 (1993) (noting the emergence of economic doctrines and
the variety of their applications within recent copyright jurisprudence).
[116] See 1 NIMMER, supra note 19, § 1.03 [A]. It has been argued that economic analysis, which
largely concerns itself with resource-allocation efficiency, ignores more intangible factors such as
justice or fairness. See HIRSCH, supra note 111, at 8. As previously discussed though, the courts and
Congress have constructed copyright law with an underlying goal being the achievement of the greatest
common good for creative works - that is, an efficient allocation of the "resource" of creative works.
[17 See Coase, supra note 109, at 2.

[118] A plaintiff in a copyright infringement suit may seek a number of remedies against the defendant,
including: temporary or permanent injunction restraining the defendant's use of the author's work,
impounding and destruction of the infringing copies, recovery of plaintiffs actual damages and any
profits the infringer received on account of the appropriation, and, at the court's discretion, the plaintiffs
court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. In addition, particularly egregious copyright infringements
may constitute a criminal offense. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-506 (1999).
[1191 One could argue that the enforcement of a right, especially a property right, does not "harm" the
infringer any more than an airplane "harms" a passenger who chooses to jump out of the plane and
subsequently falls to his death. Both persons possess a kind of notice - the plane passenger sees the
plane's altitude by looking out of a window and knows that he is far from the ground below; the
copyright infringer sees the widely-recognized (c) on a work and knows that the expression of the work
is another's property. Both persons know (or should know) the likely ramifications of pursuing their
respective courses of action (jumping or infringing). Where an injury is, in actuality, the logical
outgrowth of a person's own chosen course of action, that person has, in effect, harmed himself. On the
other hand, there is a critical difference between enforcement of property law and enforcement of the
law of gravity. The former requires a person to invoke the power of the State. By setting a court into
motion, the plaintiff becomes much more of a participating actor in the enforcement of his property
right. As such, he becomes a party to the imposition of any fine or penalty against the infringer.
Removing the court from the process, a property right could also be directly enforced by the owner.
Certainly, an unlucky trespasser will experience, with painful clarity, the "harm" from a property owner
who strictly enforces a "Trespassers Will Be Shot On Sight" notice.
[1201 Obviously, a would be infringer (or more charitably, an appropriator) possesses the natural
inclination to appropriate as much of the author's expression as he may have need. Conversely, the
author desires the most copyright protection he may avail himself of in order to preserve the work. By
optimal appropriation, I refer to the point where these two competing interests meet. Somewhere
between the ideas of sacrosanct protection of an author's work, where no one may ever utilize even a
minuscule rendering of the work, and common ownership of the expression, where anyone could freely
appropriate the author's expression for any purpose, exists a level of appropriation which reflects the
greatest common good - that is, where the least amount of protected expression is appropriated so that
the author still feels that his work's integrity (or, for an artist with a stronger profit motive, his right to
reap the monetary rewards of his labor) remains satisfactorily intact. Ideally, the author will experience
no disincentive to expend less creative energy in the future. Just as the artist feels protected, this optimal
appropriation also reflects the point where subsequent users will be more inclined to incorporate,
expound upon, and perhaps improve the author's work without the stifling threat of legal liability.
Achieving this optimal level of appropriation is, I believe, the overarching goal of American copyright
protection.
[1211 See Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L.
REV. 451, 458 (1974). Microeconomic theory admittedly assumes that human beings will act according
to their own best interests; that their activities are an accurate reflection of their preferences and desires.
Some have criticized economists' implicitly equating human desire with human action, arguing that such
a categorization does not adequately describe the law's underpinnings.
[122I See supra note 6. All the more likely since the infringing work was based on a photograph of Ex
Nihilo.
[123 Indeed, the latter consideration raises an interesting point: within the previously discussed
holdings, no court ever addresses the possibility that copyright law should, as a normative endeavor,
actively try to prevent unlawful appropriation before an infringement occurs. Hart's suit arose because

Frederick Hart happened to see his work portrayed within THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE. To the author's
knowledge, no statistical research exists measuring the amount of unreported copyright infringement
occurring in the United States. Given that an author would only discover an infringement of his work by
happenstance - either his own observations or word of mouth - one might intuit that a high frequency of
undiscovered copyright infringements exist at any one time.
[124] See e.g., Sandoval, 147 F.3d 215; Ringgold, 126 F.3d 70; Woods, 920 F. Supp. 62.
[125] When one considers the rising cost of litigation in general, utilizing the courts can be a rather
expensive undertaking for copyright litigants.
[26] See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
[127] See PeterPanFabrics,274 F.2d at 489.
[128] The following excerpt comically illustrates the use of expert opinions (and some dangerous
repercussions) in a fictional court case. In it, the editors of a certain inter-galactic guidebook which, in
certain sections, is "definitively inaccurate," faced several plaintiffs in a court of law:
[W]hen the Editors of the Guide were sued by the families of those who died as
a result of taking the entry on the planet Traal literally (it said 'Ravenous
Bugblatter Beasts often make a very good meal for visiting tourists' instead of
'Ravenous Bugblatter Beasts often make a very good meal of visiting tourists'),
they claimed that the first version of the sentence was the more aesthetically
pleasing, summoned a qualified poet to testify under oath that beauty was truth,
truth beauty and hoped thereby to prove that the guilty party in this case was
Life itself for failing to be either beautiful or true. The judges concurred, and in
a moving speech held that Life itself was in contempt of court, and duly
confiscated it from all those there present...
See DOUGLAS ADAMS, The Restaurantat the End of the Universe, in THE ULTIMATE
HITCHIKER'S GUIDE (1997) at 174. On a more serious vein, at least one author has seriously
questioned the relative value of expert testimony in legal proceedings. See Paul Rice, Expert Testimony:
A Debate Between Logic or Tradition Rather Than Between Deference or Education, 87 NW. U.L.
REV. 1166, 1167 (1993) (arguing that compulsory deference to any witness is inconsistent with the factfinding role of a jury).
[129] Such a goal would also fall in line with the impetus driving alternative dispute resolution in
general. See William H. Daughtrey, Jr. and Donnie L. Kidd, Jr., Shifting Attorney's Fees in Litigation
Attacking CommercialArbitrationAwards: A Disincentivefor Meritless Motionsfor Correction,
Modification or Vacatur, 35 AM. BUS. L. J. 515, 519-520 (1998) (stating that commercial arbitration
provides quick, economical, and final resolution and avoids expenses associated with litigation); Donald
Weckstein, In Praiseof PartyEmpowerment - and of MediatorActivism, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
501, 502 (1997) (noting that mediation allows parties to decide how best to resolve their own conflicts);
Monica L. Warmbrod, Could an Attorney FaceDisciplinaryActions or Even Legal Malpractice
Liabilityfor Failureto Inform Clients ofAlternative Dispute Resolution?, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 791, 817
(1996-1997) (arguing that alternative dispute resolution can "promote reconciliation and prevent
conflicts from escalating into litigation"); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Representation and the Next
Steps Toward Client Control: Attorney Malpracticefor the Failureto Allow the Client to Control
Negotiation and PursueAlternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819, 869 (1990) (noting

that alternative dispute resolution not only resolves a present dispute, but might reconcile the parties).
[130 Of course, exact predictions may prove to be impossible, but at the very least a director (or anyone
who wishes to utilize parts of an author's copyrighted work) could provide estimates of time duration,
point of view, frequency of appearance, or any alterations which would give the author a fairly good
idea of the director's "vision" for the author's work within the film.
[11 See supra note 6.
[132] See Id.
[133 See 1 NIvMER, supra note 19, § 13.03[B][2]. By protected expression, I refer to an author's
copyrighted expressions which the copyright law protects as opposed to mere ideas, which remain
unprotected. A plaintiff must always demonstrate that a defendant copied his expression, not the
underlying idea.
[134 At present, I will purposely forego any in depth consideration about the best manner in which to
enact this rule. Intuitively, I am inclined to think that legislation would be the most efficient manner of
implementation. An amended statute on the heels of an open and lengthy Committee debate would
attract the most attention, informing the greatest number of interested parties about the change in the
law. Moreover, the communication of the rule through a clear and certain medium such as legislative
enactment would encourage compliance with the rule.
[135] See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
[16] Over time, a standard notice form would probably develop. At a minimum, the notice would
include: the infringer's name and address, the title of the author's work, the form and manner which the
infringer wishes to incorporate the author's work, and perhaps an opening offer (which might include a
proposed licensing fee, restrictions on use of the expression, and a time and place to discuss the
infringer's use).
[137 See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
[13J8] See supra note 6.
[139] See supra note 117.
[L4] See Discussion, supra para. 31.
[141] See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
[1421 Professor Latman first posited the term, "probative similarities" as a useful sobriquet to describe
similarities between works which tend to prove actual copying (the first prong of the Arnstein test).
Such evidence may come in the form of the obvious, such as the plaintiffs signature appearing within
the defendant's work, to the more subtle, such as common errors appearing in both works. See Alan
Latman, "ProbativeSimilarity" as Proofof Copying: Toward DispellingSome Myths in Copyright
Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1204-1205 (1990).
[143 See generallySandoval, 147 F.3d at 216; Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 75; Heim, 154 F.2d at 487;
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467; Woods, 920 F.Supp. st 62.

[144] Assuming that infringers are aware of and understand the implications of the rule.
[145 See Discussion, supra para. 39.
L146J One could argue that by curtailing the de minimis defense and requiring author notification, this
rule unfairly balances equities on the side of authors. In other words, authors will have tremendous
leverage at any subsequent negotiation, and could simply refuse any offer by threatening litigation.
Negotiation might, in essence, become little more than organized extortion against infringers. The
presence of a professional mediator would, I believe, alleviate such a problem. As a neutral party, the
mediator could objectively balance the competing interests of authors and infringers. Moreover, should
negotiations break down due to an author's intransigentism, an infringer who pushes ahead with his
proposed use could bring evidence of the mediator's findings should the author file a claim. A court, free
to engage in a de minimis analysis since the author had received notice, might find that the evidence of
the mediator's proposal (which presumably the infringer had been willing to pay) coupled with the
author's unreasonable refusal establishes that the infringer's use was merely de minimis.
[147] See supra note 117.
[14J See WECKSTEIN, supra note 126, at 502.
[149] Warner Bros. is indeed a juggernaut in the film entertainment industry. As of October 19, 1999,
Time Warner, Inc., of which Warner Bros. is a subsidiary holding, earned approximately
$14,582,000,000 in revenues yielding $168,000,000 in net income for 1999. See Time Warner, Inc.'s
financial profile at <http://nscp.snap.com/main/finance/stock/profile/0,206,nscp-TWX US 2,00.html?
st.sn.qnav.0.mn206>.
[150] 783 F. 2d at 425.
L[ 1.1 Id. at 445.
L[1 See id.
U1531 Id.
LL54 See id. at 450.
L1551 See Proposed Rule, supra at para. 43.
L56I See 2 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 82, § 7.3.1, n. 1.
[157] The Kramer decision also broke new ground in classifying the scope of copyright protection over
audiovisuals in video games as encompassing the underlying computer program as well. See Christos P.
Badavas, Note, MIDI Files: Copyright Protectionfor Computer Generated Works, 35 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1135, 1152 (1994).
[18] See Proposed Rule, supra at para. 43.
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